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Frank Umbach
Thanks to its population and fasteconomic growth, China be-gins the 21st century as an ex-
panding regional power and possible
superpower. Its 1.3 billion people con-
stitute one-fifth of world population,
Its economy grew 8.2 percent in 2002
and 7.3 percent in 2001.
In coming decades, then, China
could fundamentally change the in-
ternational system. Efforts to encour-
age Beijing to pursue a cooperative
and responsible foreign policy there-
fore have strategic significance with
global ramifications. Even though
China increasingly faces many social
and economic problems, these are
often largely ignored, dismissed, or
marginalized by observers in other
countries. The dominant impression
China makes abroad is that of a major
power on a seemingly inexorable path
of expansion that is already influenc-
ing the foreign, security, and defense
policies of China’s Asian neighbors
(especially Japan and India), Russia,
and the United States.
Even though most foreign policy
experts in China describe Beijing’s
policy priorities as confined to the im-
mediate Asia-Pacific region, they have
also come to recognize China’s need to
exercise an increasingly globally-ori-
ented policy, given the country’s re-
cently-acquired economic and politi-
cal heft, the expectations and percep-
tions of other countries, and concrete
economic requirements. Nowhere is
this need more apparent than in
China’s response to its rapidly increas-
ing dependence on foreign oil. The
economy’s steady, high growth rate
could force China to import 30 to 35
percent of its national energy needs in
2005, and up to 45 percent by 2010.
Dependence of this magnitude is
forcing the Chinese leadership to take
positions toward countries and re-
gions that previously played only
minor roles or none at all in Chinese
foreign policy.China now has vital na-
tional security interests in the Middle
East and Central Asia. It must also pay
more attention to issues of political
stability in these regions to ensure the
country’s future energy flow as a basis
for economic growth and social sta-
bility.For these reasons, the challenges
of guaranteeing China’s energy secu-
rity have, since the mid-1990s, gone
from “low” to “high” politics, requir-
ing the attention of the most senior
echelons in Beijing.
The huge additional demand for oil
in China and East Asia should be met
by the predicted increase in global
crude oil production,China’s increas-
ingly market-oriented economy, and
conservation efforts.Still,prices could
begin rising by 2010. Heightened eco-
nomic and political conflict, mainly
with Japan, India, the US, and, in the
longer term, Russia and even the Eu-
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ropean Union over the earth’s dwin-
dling oil reserves, especially those in
Central Asia,cannot totally be exclud-
ed. Strategic rivalries between these
great powers are growing, and these
resources are regarded (except by the
European Union) as strategic goods
and not just commodity goods.
The states of the Persian Gulf and
Central Asia have therefore become
strategically significant for China and
East Asia, not only in terms of energy
policy, but also of broader security in-
terests. China’s process of “globaliz-
ing” its foreign policy, of reaching out
towards the Gulf, Africa, and even
Latin America since the mid-1990s
shows the strategic consequences of
rapidly-growing gas and oil imports
from countries beyond the Asia-Pacif-
ic region. The new economic and po-
litical interdependence and its geopo-
litical implications for China’s foreign
policy have been mostly ignored in
Europe, even though these realities
pose just as important challenges to
political and economic stability for
Europe as for the US.
Even if trends in China’s “near
abroad” developed favorably for Bei-
jing’s interest in the 1990s and the Peo-
ple’s Republic has discovered a new
self-assurance, especially toward
Southeast Asia, potential new threats
have also emerged. Chief among these
is the ambivalent relationship with the
US, which is marked both by admira-
tion and strategic conflicts of interest.
The main point of contention between
the two states is the unresolved issue of
reunification with Taiwan, which, to-
gether with economic modernization,
has the highest priority for China’s po-
litical and military leadership. In the
past China (like other countries) has
displayed a willingness to use military
force to achieve its political aims. On
the other hand, its present, still limited
military capabilities often functioned
as a brake on ambitious foreign policy
objectives. Therefore, many analysts
now fear that Beijing will use its eco-
nomic options and enhanced military
status to take greater foreign policy
risks in the future.
The Chinese leadership regards the
issue of Taiwan and territorial con-
flicts in the South China Sea as pri-
marily domestic affairs and refuses to
tolerate any outside interference.
Moreover, China feels threatened on
its southern flank by India, the Kash-
mir conflict, and attendant scenarios
of nuclear escalation between India
and Beijing’s ally, Pakistan. China also
feels exposed to the destabilizing
threat of Islamic fundamentalism and
its expansion from Afghanistan
through Central Asia into the western
Chinese province of Sinkiang.
Security Policy
The strategic rivalry with the US,
Japan, and India, and particularly the
unresolved Taiwan conflict determine
China’s defense and security policy.
The country has been increasing its an-
nual military appropriations by dou-
ble-digit percentages for more than
thirteen years. In many of these years
the defense budget seems to have been
increasing faster than the gross domes-
tic product and total state spending. In
2001 and 2002 defense outlays grew by
17.7 and 17.6 percent respectively.
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Even the official defense budget for
2000 of at least $17.2 billion exceeded
those of Taiwan, South Korea, and
India together. In 2002 the official de-
fense budget alone amounted to $20
billion—a total increase of 35 percent
on the year 2000. Officially, the Chi-
nese leadership justified this rise by
pointing to higher pay, increased
spending on military training, and
gaps in the budget that stemmed from
the cessation of numerous lucrative
business activities the People’s Libera-
tion Army had engaged in since 1998.
These explanations are accurate,
but incomplete, as spending on re-
search and development and military
procurements also increased. Individ-
ual Chinese military policy experts
now freely admit that the country’s
military budget cannot be compared
to those of other countries using Unit-
ed Nations or NATO criteria. Interna-
tional security and military analysts
estimate that China’s actual military
spending to be two to five times higher
than that officially stated. Factoring in
purchasing power parities, the Penta-
gon for the first time officially placed
China’s actual defense outlays in 2002
at up to $65 billion. Even many esti-
mates place China’s military spending
above Japan’s $45 billion and make
China’s defense budget third only to
that of the US and Russia.
Military Modernization
Beijing’s ongoing military modern-
ization depends greatly on weapons
systems and technology imported
from Russia. The Swedish peace re-
search institute SIPRI estimates that
China imported $10.78 billion in
weapons systems in the past decade,
with more than 90 percent of this
coming from Russia. As of 2000,
China became the world’s biggest
arms importer, ahead of India,
Turkey, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia. Yet
even this figure is probably too con-
servative, since it does not include all
deliveries of tanks, artillery and radar
systems, rockets, and helicopters, or
transfers of technology. In 2002 alone
new arms deliveries were basically
agreed between Russia and China that
amounted to almost $5 billion.
Efforts to modernize and stream-
line the 2.5 million strong People’s
Liberation Army are being combined
with comprehensive structural re-
forms. The military must pay special
attention to technical training, which
can succeed only by recruiting a new
and technically gifted officer corps.
Yet in attracting the best and bright-
est, the army faces stiff competition
from the private sector, which offers
better prospects in terms of both pay
and social status. On September 1,
2003, China announced a further cut
of 200,000 in its armed forces within
two years, after a previous demobi-
lization of 500,000 during the Ninth
Five-Year-Plan period (1996–2000).
Even then the PLA will remain the
world’s largest armed force. But the
scope of the reductions appears to fall
far short of the cuts anticipated by
some Chinese and foreign military ex-
perts, who predicted another down-
sizing by 500,000 soldiers. Nonethe-
less, the Chinese version of the “Revo-
lution in Military Affairs” follows the
recognition of the need for smaller,
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more mobile, and better-equipped
armed force, controlled by a powerful
central command. It also reflects the
planned transition from mechanized
to information warfare.
China and Russia
China has also had to come up with
a response to the pro-Western foreign
policy of Russian President Vladimir
Putin, who has re-evaluated his coun-
try’s bilateral ties with China and
India. Putin has significantly expand-
ed Russia’s military and technological
cooperation with India and wants to
provide New Delhi with nuclear-pow-
ered submarines and TU-22 “Back-
fire” bombers, yet refuses to give Bei-
jing access to these systems. Moscow
is also unwilling to agree on cooperat-
ing with the Chinese on a new genera-
tion of weapons systems, even though
similar agreements have already been
concluded with India.
Russia’s growing wariness of China
is not limited to its long border with
the People’s Republic. Russian policy
toward China, recognizing the evolv-
ing balance of power between the two
powers is increasingly focused on
Central Asia. The two countries’ joint
activities within the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization (SCO) neither
contradict this nor suggest common
interests. The SCO is merely evidence
that Russia wants to incorporate
China into regional structures so as to
be better able to control or at least in-
fluence Beijing’s conduct through im-
proved cooperation and transparency.
The military-strategic balance be-
tween Moscow and Beijing will also
change increasingly over time.China’s
strategic nuclear weapons program is
currently the world’s largest. It is the
only nuclear power to be simultane-
ously working on two intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile (ICBM) programs,
a new generation of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), a
nuclear-powered strategic submarine
(SSBN), and cruise missiles capable of
carrying nuclear warheads. Should
China decide to deploy its ICBM and
SLBM systems with at least three inde-
pendently-targeted warheads per mis-
sile—a development that has become
likelier after Russia agreed to deep cuts
in the Strategic Offensive Reduction
Treaty (SORT) with the US and let the
second Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START II) expire in 2002—
China could theoretically equal Rus-
sia’s strategic nuclear arsenal of 900
warheads in some 15 years.
These weapons programs, and the
fact that Beijing has never been in-
cluded in any comparable nuclear dis-
armament negotiations, make a
strategic dialog between the US and
China especially important.The signs
are already clear that China’s current
minimal nuclear deterrent is on
course to becoming a multidimen-
sional deterrent capability, including
credible minimum deterrence of the
United States and Russia; a more of-
fense-oriented limited nuclear deter-
rence of Taiwan, consisting mainly of
short- and medium-range missiles;
and an offensively-configured, pre-
emptive, counterforce war-fighting
posture of “active” or “offensive de-
fense” for the conventional missile
forces.
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In the months following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, many international
analysts doubted that there would be
any basic qualitative change in the web
of relations among China, the United
States, and Russia. However, once
Putin began seeking to cooperate ever
more closely with the US at the strate-
gic and economic levels, and even
freely permitted American military
bases to be established in Central Asia,
China became increasingly isolated
diplomatically in the issues of anti-
ballistic missiles, American missile-
shield plans, and US bases in Central
Asia. Beijing can no longer rely on the
“strategic partnership” with Moscow
that has so often been invoked,though
both sides are forced to cooperate with
each other politically, economically,
and militarily.
At the same time, the aftermath of
the 16th Party Congress, a pending
transfer of power to a new generation
of senior leaders, and socio-econom-
ic problems stemming from China’s
entry into the World Trade Organiza-
tion all ensure that the Beijing leader-
ship needs quiet on the foreign policy
front. It is noteworthy that China has
even made some foreign policy ad-
vances toward the United States, in-
cluding supporting United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1441 on
Iraq, exhibiting greater pragmatism
on the Taiwan issue, and indicating
that non-proliferation policy has
largely been detached from the issue
of US military support for Taipei. The
economic reforms that have been ac-
companied by rising corruption and
eroding control mechanisms could
still cause considerable bilateral pro-
blems, but both sides are more likely
to place greater emphasis on the co-
operative elements in their “strategic
dialog.”
NATO, with its eastward enlarge-
ment, expanding cooperation with
Central Asian states, and closer rela-
tionship with Moscow through the
NATO-Russia Council, is also coming
closer to China’s borders. Where this
would once have raised suspicion and
fears of encirclement in Beijing,China
is seeking—for the first time in its his-
tory—dialog and cooperation with
NATO as well.
None of this means that Beijing
would relinquish its strategic objective
of reunification with Taiwan or a total
subordination of its program of mili-
tary modernization to economic re-
forms—as has been made abundantly
clear by the continued growth of mili-
tary expenditures during times of
record budget deficits (amounting to
$37.5 billion,up 19.2 percent on 2001)
and explicitly confirmed in the “White
Paper on China’s Defense in 2002.”
Therefore the decisive consideration
for the United States and countries
neighboring China in the immediate
term will be to heighten the trans-
parency of Beijing’s security policy
and arms procurement programs
through dialog and cooperation. In
the medium term the two sides will
have to develop a new, joint security
philosophy (“mutual security”) on the
basis of multilateral institutions.
NATO should also take up the Chinese
offer of dialog and work to institution-
alize it, in the interests both of China
and of itself in light of the new global
security challenges.
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